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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
After more than five decades of conflict that left more than 220 thousand 
men, women, and children dead and over six million displaced, the Colombian 
government in 2012 initiated negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC), the country’s largest and longest standing guerrilla group.  
On August 24, 2016, the government and the FARC announced that they had 
reached a final, integral, and definitive agreement on all the points on their 
agenda: (1) land and rural development; (2) political participation; (3) bilateral 
ceasefire and disarmament—including security guarantees for FARC members as 
they reintegrate civilian life as well as measures to combat illegal armed groups; 
(4) illicit drugs; (5) accountability and reparations for victims—including the 
creation of a truth commission; and (6) implementation and verification 
mechanisms.  This “General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and 
the Construction of a Stable and Sustainable Peace in Colombia” was submitted 
to a popular vote via a plebiscite on October 21 and President Juan Manual Santos 
ordered a definitive ceasefire effective August 29th.2 
On October 2, voters narrowly rejected the peace deal due in part to concerns 
regarding the amnesty to FARC members and the FARC’s participation in 
politics. 3  The government and the FARC resumed negotiations to take into 
account the concerns of those who voted against the agreement.  A new 
agreement was reached on November 11th which maintains the key provisions on 
amnesty.  The revised agreement was ratified on December 1—bypassing another 
popular vote.4  Colombia has never been so close to peace. 
Earlier in the process, on September 23, 2015, in a historic meeting in 
Havana, Cuba, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leader 
Timochenko announced that the two parties had reached an agreement on 
transitional justice, including accountability and reparations for victims, one of 
the most contentious items on their agenda.  On December 15, 2015, the two 
parties published the detailed agreement on “Victims of the Conflict: Integral 
System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and non-Repetition” (Victims and Justice 
Agreement), including provisions for the “Special Jurisdiction for Peace” (SJP), 
and the “Human Rights Commitment.”5 
The agreement calls for the creation of an integral system of truth, justice, 
and reparation including a “Commission for the Clarification of Truth, 
 
1 Helen Murphy, Colombia's Santos Calls Peace Plebiscite in Oct., REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2016, 12:27 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-idUSKCN11526Y. 
2 Andrew Schipani, Colombian President Declares Definitive Ceasefire with Farc, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/c687cb74-418a-3e1f-afa1-d419b7376c8d. 
3 Julia Symmes Cobb & Nicholas Casey, Colombia Peace Deal Is Defeated, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html. 
4 Nicholas Casey, Colombia’s Congress Approves Peace Accord With FARC, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/americas/colombia-farc-accord-juan-manuel-
santos.html; Colombia Approves Amnesty Agreed in Farc Peace Deal, B.B.C. (Dec. 28, 2016), 
http://www.bbc. com/news/world-latin-america-38455493. 
5 Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del Conflicto: “Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No 
Repetición,” incluyendo la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz; y Compromiso sobre Derechos Humanos, 
Dec. 15, 2015, http://wp.presidencia.gov.co/sitios/especiales/Documents/20150921-declaracion-proceso-
paz/docs/Punto5-Victimas.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). 
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Coexistence, and Non-Repetition” (Truth Commission), a “Special Search Unit” 
to try to locate the many disappeared, and the SJP.  The SJP will include trial and 
appellate courts and will provide for expedited trials for those who recognize their 
responsibility and participate in the Truth Commission process.  Those in this 
category will also benefit from lower sentences, between five to eight years, and 
will serve their sentence under a special, flexible detention regime.  Those who do 
not recognize their responsibility could face up to twenty years in prison under 
ordinary prison conditions. 
The agreement also provides that the government will, at the end of 
hostilities, grant the widest possible amnesty for political crimes and crimes 
connected to political crimes.  These crimes for purposes of the amnesty include: 
rebellion, sedition, rioting, illegal possession of weapons, murder in combat that 
is compatible with international humanitarian law, conspiracy to commit the 
crime of rebellion, and other connected crimes.  The amnesty extinguishes 
investigations as well as administrative and disciplinary proceedings for conduct 
that is subject to the amnesty. 
Excluded from the amnesty are:  crimes against humanity, genocide, war 
crimes, the taking of hostages, serious deprivations of liberty, torture, forced 
displacement, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, 
child abduction, and recruitment of child soldiers.  Common crimes with no 
connection to the conflict or rebellion are also excluded from the amnesty.  
Crimes excluded from the amnesty will be prosecuted by the SJP and perpetrators 
will be required to participate in truth proceedings.  There is a possibility that 
offenders amnestied for political crimes and related offenses could still be subject 
to the SJP for other crimes not contemplated in the amnesty including serious 
offenses. 
The amnesty will extend only to members of the FARC and those who have 
been convicted of political crimes or crimes connected to political crimes in the 
ordinary justice system, but not in the military courts.  It does not apply to the 
military.  The agreement contemplates that the national legislature will enact a 
law to determine which crimes are subject to amnesty, along with the criteria for 
which crimes are connected to political crimes.  A “Special Chamber” within the 
SJP will have responsibility for granting amnesty and making the determination 
of which crimes are connected to political crimes.  The amnesty law will also set 
out the details of the constitution and workings of the Special Chamber.  Victims 
of crimes for which perpetrators have received amnesty would still be eligible for 
reparations. 
The amnesty law was approved by congress and signed by the President on 
December 30th, 2016.  It is currently pending review before the Constitutional 
Court.  The law maintains the main provisions regarding amnesty for FARC 
members detailed in the agreement.  The article was written prior to the 
enactment of the amnesty law and therefore bases its analysis on the proposed 
amnesty in the peace agreement, which is mirrored in the law. 
The Victims and Justice Agreement specifically refers to international 
humanitarian law as the legal authority for the amnesty for political crimes.  
Commentators and members of the negotiating team have indicated that the 
amnesty provisions are based on Article 6.5 of Additional Protocol II to the 
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Geneva Conventions (Protocol II), which states that, “At the end of hostilities, the 
authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to 
persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their 
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or 
detained.”6 
This legal brief proposes to track the contours of existing international law on 
amnesty for political crimes under Protocol II in an attempt to determine whether 
the amnesty agreed upon in Colombia is indeed compatible with international 
law—specifically, Protocol II.  The conclusion is that all relevant sources of 
international law—including the Rome Statute, United Nations (U.N.) statements, 
and decisions of the Inter-American Human Rights System—support the granting 
of amnesty for political crimes as proposed in the Colombian peace accord. 
 
 
I. ORIGINS OF AMNESTY 
 
 
Amnesty is a sovereign act of forgiveness which prevents punishment of 
crimes committed in the past and is usually granted to a group of persons as a 
whole.7  In most cases, “it provides for immunity from the usual operation of the 
law and prevents criminal, administrative, disciplinary and civil proceedings.”8 
Amnesty originated in early attempts to promote peace between warring 
states or the state and rebels, and to ensure lasting victory over conquered 
territory.  In 40 BCE, a revolt overthrew the oligarchic provisional government in 
Athens known as the “Thirty Tyrants,”9 resulting in a civil war.  An agreement 
was brokered to put an end to the conflict, the principles of which included the 
prosecution of criminal acts and amnesty for all other acts associated with the 
war.10  It stated that no one should be accused or punished after amnesty had been 
decreed for wrongs and offenses committed on either side.  Athenians had to take 
an oath respecting the amnesty. 
Following the Athenian experience, amnesties continued to be used and to 
become increasingly accepted as a way of ending rebellions or riots and ensuring 
lasting peace and reconciliation.  For example, the Thirty Years War arose out of 
the Revolt of Bohemia, which had been rooted in religious tensions exacerbated 
by the Peace of Augsburg of 1555.11  The circumstances required a radical 
disregard of the war’s offenses if a suitable peace was to be achieved, and this led 
to the addition of an amnesty provision in the Westphalia peace treaty in 1648.  
This amnesty covered criminal and civil liabilities and prohibited all acts of 
 
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6.5, June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
7 Some amnesties granted while a conflict is ongoing to encourage rebels to surrender and disarm give 
combatants a deadline by which to surrender; any eligible crimes committed up to that deadline are 
included even if committed after the amnesty was enacted. 
8 Anja Seibert-Fohr, Amnesties in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(MPEPIL) 2 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2010), opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
9 See N.G.L. HAMMOND, A HISTORY OF GREECE TO 322 B.C. 443–48 (1st ed. 1957). 
10 Id. at 447. 
11 See generally G. PAGÈS, THIRTY YEARS WAR 1618–1648 (David Maland & John Hooper, trans., 
Harper & Row 1971) (1939). 
2017 Jean-Baptiste: Cracking the Toughest Nut 31 
retribution.  Similarly, the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29 concluded with a grant 
of amnesty to all belligerents.  These amnesties covered mostly combatants from 
opposing States and protected them from criminal prosecution.  “Their purpose 
was to encourage erasure of the past and prevent resurrection of hostilities out of 
revenge.”12 
The post-World War II period saw a dramatic increase in non-international 
conflicts pitting state forces against domestic armed groups.  Despite the change 
in the nature of the conflicts, amnesties continued to serve as an incentive to end 
those conflicts.13   Even with the advent of international justice mechanisms and 
the increased focus on fighting impunity, amnesties continue to find use for their 
contribution to peace and reconciliation following conflicts.14 
 
A. The Geneva Conventions and Protocol II 
 
The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols 
together form the core of international humanitarian law, which is the law 
governing the conduct of hostilities.  This is also known as the law of war or the 
law of armed conflict.  All countries in the world “are bound by the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, which, in times of armed conflict, protect wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked members of the armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilians.15  
Over three-quarters of all States are currently party to the two 1977 Protocols 
additional to the Conventions.”16  Additional Protocol I protects the victims of 
international armed conflicts and Additional Protocol II (Protocol II) the victims 
of non-international armed conflicts.17 
The first provision of international law on non-international armed conflict 
was Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.18  Protocol II came later and 
was designed to develop the law of internal armed conflict beyond the limited 
concepts outlined in Common Article 3.  It was the first international treaty 
devoted exclusively to non-international armed conflicts.19 
Protocol II applies in non-international armed conflict taking place in the 
territory of a Contracting State between the armed forces and dissident armed 
forces or other organized armed groups with a responsible command and 
territorial control.20  Protocol II is applicable only in non-international armed 
 
12 Seibert-Fohr, supra note 8, ¶ 1. 
13 Anja Seibert-Fohr, Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Situations in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (MPEPIL) ¶ 2-5 2011 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2010), opil.ouplaw.com/ 
home/EPIL. 
14 José E. Alvarez, Alternatives to International Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25, 34 (Antonio Cassese, ed., 2009) (“Amnesties are nonetheless the 
most consistently used ‘alternative’ to national or international criminal accountability. . . . [T]he fact 
remains that amnesties have been deployed by virtually every society in every age and will probably 
continue to be at least attempted even in the age of internationalized criminal courts.”). 
15 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols (Oct. 29, 2010), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-
conventions.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). 
16 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The ICRC’s Mandate and Mission, https://www.icrc.org/en/man 
date-and-mission (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). 
17 Id. 
18 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, supra note 15. 
19 Id. 
20 Protocol II, supra note 6, art. 1. 
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conflicts involving a High Contracting Party and a dissident armed group 
exercising some territorial control.21 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 
leading authority on the Geneva Conventions, “in the years since the adoption of 
Protocol II, there has been an emergent acceptance of the principles underlying 
Protocol II, if not the Protocol itself in its entirety.”22  An ICRC study of 
customary international humanitarian law concluded that Additional Protocol II 
had been accepted by States as declaratory of customary international law.23  As 
such, it arguably applies even to States that have not formally adopted it. 
Protocol II was adopted at the “Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts,” 
which took place in Geneva from 1974 to 1977.24  Colombia participated in the 
conference and joined in its adoption.25  Colombia ratified the Protocol in 1995.26 
The Protocol’s provision on amnesty was included in the first draft that the 
ICRC submitted to the conference.27  The provision remained substantially 
similar throughout the negotiations and there was wide consensus in favor of the 
provision.28  Indeed, no State contested the idea that amnesty may be granted for 
participation in hostilities at the end of conflicts.29 The debate concerning the 
provision centered on whether amnesty should be mandatory or recommended 
and who has the power to grant such amnesty.30 However, the basic idea of such 
amnesty was not contested. 
 
 
 
 
21 See id. (stating that the article does not apply to international conflict related to Protocol I). 
22 Emily Crawford, Geneva Conventions Additional Protocols II (1977), in 2 THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT AND THE USE OF FORCE: THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
390, 392 (Frauke Lachenmann & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2017). 
23 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 188–90 (prtg. 2009). 
24 See Library of Congress, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (2010), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/RC-dipl-conference-records.html (last visited on Jan. 9, 2017). 
25 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE 
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS 4–5 (1978). 
26 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, List of State Parties to Protocol II, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySele
cted=475 (last visited Jan. 9, 2017). 
27 See 4 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON 
THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS 32–36 (1978) (outlining the suggested amendments to the draft Procol II’s Article 10: 
Penal Prosecutions that would later become Article 6). 
28 See id.; see also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Introduction to Online Archive of Protocol II 
Provisions, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 9, 
2017) (stating that the “essential substance of the draft” remained intact during the amendment process 
before the Diplomatic Conference). 
29 See id., at 32–36 (the table of amendments for Article 10: Penal Prosecutions, discussing amnesty, 
shows that no party suggested removing the provision). 
30 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute: Derogation, Amnesties, 
Statutes of Limitations, and Superior Orders, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 57, 59 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (discussing the debate over the non-mandatory 
nature of the amnesty provision during the negotiations for Protocol II). 
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II. PROTOCOL II AND THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT 
 
 
The conflict between the Colombian government, a High Contracting Party, 
and the FARC, a dissident armed group with territorial control, indisputably falls 
under Protocol II.  Colombian courts have also held that it applies to the conflict 
between the Colombian army and the FARC,31 and, according to the Colombian 
Constitutional Court, the Protocol is part of the “Constitutional Block.”32  
Protocol II is also binding on Colombia as customary international law. 
The purpose of Article 6.5 of Protocol II, and the amnesty it calls for, is to 
assist the return to normal life in countries that have suffered internal conflict.  
The Protocol at a minimum actively encourages States to adopt such amnesty by 
using the word “shall”: 
 
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour 
to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their 
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are 
interned or detained.33 
 
Article 6.5 is quite restrictive, however, and is concerned strictly with 
combatant immunity—that is, only conduct related to normal or standard 
participation in hostilities.  It does not extend to conduct that amounts to war 
crimes and other serious international crimes, including at a minimum, crimes 
against humanity and genocide.34  At the time of its adoption, the Soviet Union 
stated, in explanation of its affirmative vote, that the provision could not be 
construed to enable war criminals, or those guilty of crimes against humanity, 
to evade punishment.35  The ICRC itself has adopted this interpretation, which 
moreover is compatible with the obligation under the Conventions to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators of war crimes.36 
 
31 Corte Suprema de Justicia (C.S.J) [Supreme Court], Sala. de Casación Penal – Segunda Instancia de 
Justicia y Paz septiembre 21, 2009, M.P: Sigifredo Espinoza, Radicado 32.022, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 
299, P. 195) (Colom.). (ruling that Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are applicable to the 
Colombian conflict); República de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa National, Directiva Permanente No. 
10 2007. June 6, 2007 (declaring that the provisions contained in both Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II were applicable to the situation in Colombia). 
32 A “Constitutional Block” is “[a] set of norms and principles with constitutional rank that . . . 
encompasses 1) the Constitution stricto sensu, 2) international declarations of human rights, such as the 
Universal Declaration and the American Declaration, and 3) human rights treaties ratified by the States.” 
Manuel Eduardo Góngora Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism: On the Constitutional Rank of 
Human Rights Treaties in Latin America through National and Inter-American Adjudication 162 (Inter-
American Institute of Human Rights, 2011).  See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 
25, 2007, Sentencia C-291/07, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]  (Colom.); Corte Constitucional 
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995, Sentencia C-225/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional 
[G.C.C.] (p.46) (Colom.). 
33 Protocol II, supra note 6, art. 6.5 (emphasis added). 
34 Seibert-Fohr, supra note 8, ¶¶ 12–13. 
35 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 30, at 59. 
36 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Law, Rule 159: Amnesty, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule159#Fn_41_10 (last visited Dec. 10, 2015).  Some 
transitional justice scholars have argued that this interpretation of Article 6(5) is an overreach and that 
neither the Soviet Union’s explanation of vote nor state practice provides sufficient ground for such an 
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A key question is whether amnesty pursuant to the Protocol extends to certain 
offenses under domestic law connected with the participation in hostilities, 
commonly referred to as political crimes37 so long as they do not amount to war 
crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or other international crimes.  
There is no internationally accepted definition of political crimes and each 
country has defined the concept differently.  The Protocol itself does not include a 
list of crimes connected to the participation in hostilities that could benefit from 
amnesty and there are no authoritative interpretations of what those crimes might 
be.  A study by the author of amnesties adopted under the Protocol that have been 
accepted both domestically and by the international community, including the 
UN, shows that the offenses deemed “related to the participation in hostilities” are 
the same as the notion of political crimes in other areas of the law—in extradition 
law, for example. 
Article 6.5 of Protocol II can therefore be deemed to apply to political crimes 
and by extension to crimes connected to political crimes.  For a political crime to 
qualify for amnesty under the Protocol, however, it must not constitute a war 
crime or a serious international crime including genocide and crime against 
humanity. The same applies to connected crimes.  Even if the original political 
crime qualifies for amnesty under Protocol II, the connected crime cannot be 
amnestied if it is a war crime, and vice versa.  For example, if a rebel group 
engages in an attack against government troops, the attack itself may be 
considered a political crime and subject to amnesty under Protocol II; however, if 
in the course of the attack, the group indiscriminately murders civilians, this 
connected crime is a war crime and cannot be amnestied.  Protocol II is therefore 
not a blanket endorsement of amnesty for political crimes.  It includes an 
important caveat, which is that the acts must not constitute war crimes or serious 
international crimes.  This is an important distinction to keep in mind as we 
discuss and analyze amnesty under Protocol II throughout this brief. 
 
 
III. AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL CRIMES UNDER PROTOCOL II IS PERMISSIBLE 
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE 
 
 
Colombia signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
on December 10, 1998 and ratified it on August 5, 2002.38  Even though the 
Statute prohibits reservations, Colombia made a declaration under Article 124 and 
 
interpretation.  They point to the fact that amnesties including those covering grave violations continue to 
be adopted and no international treaty to date includes such a prohibition.  See, Legal Status of Amnesty, 
Third party intervention in the case of Marguš v. Croatia, Application no. 4455/10 (May 29, 2013); Louise 
Mallinder, The End Of Amnesty Or Regional Overreach? Interpreting The Erosion Of South America’s 
Amnesty Laws, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q., no. 3, 2016, at 645–80; Louise Mallinder, Amnesties' Challenge to 
the Global Accountability Norm?: Interpreting Regional and International Trends in Amnesty Enactment, 
in AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY 69, 69–96 (Francesca Lessa & Leigh A. 
Payne eds., 2012). 
37 Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 581, 581–610 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3rd ed. 2013). 
38 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature Jul. 17, 1998, U.N.T.S. Vol. 
2187 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
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opted out of ICC’s jurisdiction for seven years regarding war crimes when they 
are alleged to have been committed by Colombian nationals or on Colombian 
territory.39  By doing so, the government at the time sought to gain more time and 
freedom to provide as broadly as possible an amnesty to illegal armed groups 
participating in the longstanding civil conflict. 
Colombia’s declaration expired on November 1, 2009.  Therefore, the ICC 
now has full jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide 
regarding Colombia.  The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (OTP) has been 
examining the situation in Colombia and has assessed it in its 2011 report on 
preliminary examination activities40 and in its 2012 interim report.41  In the latter, 
the OTP concluded that there were reasonable bases to believe that crimes against 
humanity and war crimes have been committed by the FARC, other armed 
groups, and state actors in Colombia and that those crimes fall under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.42  Therefore, it decided to open a preliminary examination 
of the situation in Colombia.  Since then, the OTP has conducted a visit (April 
2013) and a mission (February 2015) and has issued a report on Colombia.43  In 
September 2015, the OPT welcomed the announcement by the Colombian 
Government and the FARC of an agreement on transitional justice, which 
includes the creation of the SJP and the provision on amnesty for political crimes.  
The OPT announced that it will analyze the agreement as part of its preliminary 
examination of the situation in Colombia44 and noted with approval that the 
agreement excludes the granting of amnesty for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
The Rome Statute addresses only serious international crimes such as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  It has already been established 
that amnesties for these crimes would not be permissible under Protocol II.  The 
Rome Statute does not address political crimes and is therefore not concerned 
with the issue of amnesty for political crimes under Protocol II.  In fact, the 
deputy prosecutor of the ICC, speaking at a conference in Bogota organized by 
the Vance Center in May 2015, stated that the OTP takes no position on the 
question of amnesty for political crimes, such as rebellion, treason, or sedition, as 
these crimes do not fall under the Court's jurisdiction.45  It follows that amnesty 
for such crimes therefore would not contravene the Rome Statute. 
 
39 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Colombia Declarations, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&clang=_en#EndDec. 
40 The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities ¶¶ 61–87, Dec. 13, 2011. 
41 The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Situation in Colombia Interim 
Report, Nov. 2012. 
42 Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
43 International Criminal Court, Colombia, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of% 
20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe-
ongoing/colombia/Pages/colombia.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
44 See Statement of the Prosecutor on the Agreement on the Creation of a Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace in Colombia, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_stat_24-09-2015 (last visited Mar. 
8, 2016). 
45 James Stewart, Deputy Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Transitional Justice in Colombia and the 
Role of the International Criminal Court, Keynote Speech (May 13, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-13-05-2015. 
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Less clear is the issue of connected crimes, such as murder or arbitrary 
detention that may have been committed in pursuance of these political crimes.  
Logic would dictate that the permissibility of amnesty for political crimes would 
extend to such connected crimes lest the amnesty be an empty gesture.  Indeed, 
the crimes of rebellion, sedition, and treason almost always involve the 
commission of other violent crimes and the OTP must have taken into account 
this scenario when it stated that it takes no position on amnesty for political 
crimes.  Such connected crimes can therefore also be amnestied so long as they 
do not reach the threshold of "widespread and systematic attack directed against 
the civilian population"46 which could constitute crimes against humanity or are 
not committed "as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission 
of such crimes"47 which could constitute war crimes.  It is worth noting that the 
OTP’s statement following the announcement of the transitional justice 
agreement is silent on the provision of amnesty for political crimes and crimes 
connected to political crimes.  This would be consistent with their earlier 
statement that political crimes of the kinds contemplated in the Colombian 
amnesty fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
 
IV. AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL CRIMES UNDER PROTOCOL II IS CONSISTENT WITH 
THE POSITION OF THE UN ON AMNESTY 
 
 
The UN has also recognized the value of amnesty to facilitate the 
reintegration of members of armed opposition forces and to foster national 
reconciliation, while endorsing the view that amnesties are not permissible for 
“international crimes,” such as war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law.48  The UN Secretary 
General has included a reservation to that effect in the case of Sierra Leone.  In 
2004, the UN Secretary General reported that “carefully crafted amnesties can 
help in the return and reintegration of [armed groups] and should be 
encouraged.”49  UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in 2000 that "amnesty is 
an accepted legal concept and a gesture of peace and reconciliation at the end of a 
civil war or an internal armed conflict."50  UN bodies, including the Security 
Council, have encouraged, sponsored, and supported various amnesties.  For 
example, the UN Security Council encouraged the granting of amnesties for 
political crimes in South Africa, Angola, and Croatia as has the UN General 
 
46 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, opened for signature Jul. 17, 1998, 
U.N.T.S. Vol. 2187 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
47 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, opened for signature Jul. 17, 1998, 
U.N.T.S. Vol. 2187 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
48 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, ¶ 22, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000) [hereinafter 
U.N. Report on Sierra Leone]. 
49 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 32, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Report on Rule of Law and Transitional Justice]. 
50 U.N. Report on Sierra Leone, supra note 48. 
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Assembly in Afghanistan and Kosovo.51  The UN Commission on Human Rights 
adopted resolutions in support of amnesty for political crimes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Sudan.52 
The current UN position can thus be described as favoring amnesties so long 
as they do not include war crimes and other serious international crimes.  It is 
worth noting that the UN’s norms and standards have been developed and 
adopted by countries across the globe and have been accommodated by the full 
range of legal systems of Member States, whether based in common law, civil 
law, Islamic law, or other legal traditions and therefore bring a certain legitimacy 
that individual state practice alone could not achieve.53 
 
 
V. AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL CRIMES UNDER PROTOCOL II IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER 
THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System is 
unequivocal on the impermissibility of amnesty for grave human rights 
violations.54  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission or 
IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court or IAcrtHR) have 
reviewed such amnesties in countries throughout the hemisphere and found them 
to be incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention).55 
We, however, must separate amnesty for grave human rights violations from 
amnesty for political crimes.  Neither the Commission nor the Court has yet ruled 
on amnesty for political crimes.  Therefore, should the Colombian amnesty be 
challenged in the Inter-American System, it would be an issue of first impression.  
In the following section, we look at the jurisprudence of the Commission and 
Court on amnesty in general and draw some inferences about the compatibility of 
the Colombian amnesty with this jurisprudence. 
The Commission in several cases has reiterated the same view on amnesty, a 
view, which in the Commission’s own words, is now a crystallized doctrine.  The 
doctrine is the following: amnesty laws violate various provisions of the 
American Declaration as well as the Convention, and amnesty laws and other 
legislative measures that prevent or halt the investigation and prosecution of state 
agents who may be responsible for serious violations of the American Declaration 
 
51 S.C. Res. 1120, ¶¶ 724–25 (July 14, 1997). 
52 S.C. Res. 190, ¶ 1(c) (June 9, 1964); S.C. Res. 191, ¶ 4(b) (June 18, 1964); S.C. Res. 473, ¶ 7(a) 
(June 13, 1980); S.C. Res. 1055, ¶ 9 (May 8, 1996); S.C. Res. 1120, ¶ 79 (July 14, 1997); G.A. Res. 
47/141, ¶ 8 (Mar. 1, 1993); G.A. Res. 48/152, ¶ 12 (Feb. 7, 1994); G.A. Res. 53/164 (Feb. 25, 1999). 
53 U.N. Report on Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 49. 
54 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14, 2001). 
55 Id.; Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C ) No. 124, ¶ 138(m) (June 15, 2005); Gomes Lund v. Brazil, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶ 
180 (Nov. 24, 2010); Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 221, ¶ 225 (Feb. 24, 2011); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on the Human Rights Situation in El 
Salvador, OEA/Ser.L/II.85, doc. 28 rev. (1994). 
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or Convention violate multiple provisions of said instruments.56  Indeed, in many 
ways, the Commission’s view on amnesty is quite strict, even compared with the 
Court’s. 
The Inter-American Commission has had the opportunity to analyze Article 
6.5 of Protocol II in light of the American Declaration and Convention, and in 
particular, in relation to the conflict in Colombia.  According to the Commission, 
the amnesty permitted under Article 6.5 is not applicable in cases of serious 
human rights violations, as interpreted by the Inter-American Court's 
jurisprudence.57  These serious human rights violations, in the Commission’s 
view, are not limited to just the crimes recognized under the Geneva Conventions 
but include a larger panoply of crimes.58  For States, such as Colombia, that are 
subject to human rights obligations under the Declaration and Convention, the 
prohibition on amnesty extends not only to the crimes prohibited under the 
Geneva Conventions, but also to other serious violations of physical integrity 
prohibited by the Convention and Declaration, as interpreted by the Commission 
and the Court.59  Commenting on the ICRC’s study on customary international 
humanitarian law in particular, the IACHR points out that the study does not 
consider those other international human rights obligations that are binding upon 
the States, namely those contained in the Declaration and Convention.60  Those 
international human rights obligations further restrict States’ actions under the 
Geneva Conventions; therefore, conduct that may be legal under the Geneva 
Conventions may not be so under the American Convention.61 
Even if it is clear that amnesty for political crimes not amounting to war 
crimes is legitimate under the Geneva Conventions, a separate analysis must be 
made under the Convention.  As a party to the Convention, Colombia is bound by 
its provisions and the jurisprudence of the IACHR and the IAcrtHR interpreting 
the Convention.  Only those crimes that are not considered serious human rights 
violations in the Inter-American jurisprudence can qualify as political crimes and 
be eligible for amnesty.  As the IAcrtHR stated:  amnesty laws that extend to 
grave human rights violations, violate inalienable rights recognized under the 
Convention and prevent the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of grave 
human rights violations are incompatible with the Convention.62 
The seminal case on amnesty in the Inter-American system is Barrios Altos v. 
Peru, where the Petitioners challenged, among other things, the application of the 
amnesty law in Peru, which prevented the investigation of the violations alleged 
in the case.  In a now famous passage, the Court held that: 
 
56 See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador, 
OEA/Ser.L/II.85, doc. 28 rev.  
(1994). 
57 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Truth, Justice and Reparation: Fourth Report on Human Rights Situation 
in Colombia, ¶ 269, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 49/13 (Dec. 31, 2013). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14, 2001); 
Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶138(m) (June 15, 2005); Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶ 180 (Nov. 24, 2010); Gelman v. 
Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, ¶ 225 (Feb. 24, 2011). 
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[A]ll amnesty provisions . . . are inadmissible, because they are 
intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced 
disappearance, all of them prohibited because they violate non-
derogable rights recognized by international human rights law.63 
 
The Court also found that the amnesty law violated the victims’ right to 
judicial protection and that “[t]his type of law precludes the identification of the 
individuals who are responsible for human rights violations, because it obstructs 
the investigation and access to justice and prevents the victims and their next of 
kin from knowing the truth and receiving the corresponding reparation.”64 
The Court reiterated this position in a subsequent Peruvian case, La Cantuta 
v. Peru.65  In this case, the Court found that Peru had violated the Convention by 
applying the amnesty law after it had been declared null and void by the Court in 
the Barrios Altos case.  The Court classified the events in this case as 
“international crimes” and “crimes against humanity.”66 
In the case of Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, the Court struck down the 
amnesty law in Chile, finding:  “[T]he Chilean State must carry out a judicial 
investigation of the facts related to Mr. Almonacid-Arellano’s death, attribute 
responsibilities, and punish all those who turn out to be participants.”67  The 
Court first looked at whether the murder of Mr. Almonacid-Arellano was a crime 
against humanity and found that it was.68  The Court then proceeded to find that 
Chile had violated its obligations under the Convention by keeping the amnesty 
law on the books even though it was not systematically applied.  The Court found 
that Chile should have repealed or annulled the law. 
In the case Moiwana Community v. Suriname,69 the Court had a chance to 
look at a different kind of amnesty law, one that most closely resembles the 
Colombian amnesty.  The amnesty law excluded crimes against humanity, but the 
domestic courts had classified a series of extrajudicial executions as ordinary 
crimes, not crimes against humanity, and applied the amnesty to the case.  The 
State argued that it was within its powers to grant amnesty for conduct that did 
not amount to crimes against humanity and pointed to similar amnesties enacted 
elsewhere (although it did not specify which ones).  It further argued that it was 
within a state’s discretion to waive prosecution of certain conduct if such a 
decision protected other interests “that form part of that government’s 
responsibilities, such as bringing about peace and order.”70  Although it did not 
 
63 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, ¶ 41. 
64 Id. ¶ 43. 
65 La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 
(Nov. 29, 2006). 
66 Id. ¶ 95. 
67 Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.154, ¶ 150 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
68 Id. ¶¶ 90, 99. 
69 Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005). 
70 Id. ¶ 138(m). 
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have the occasion to decide on the validity of the amnesty law itself, the Court 
nevertheless emphasized that: 
 
[I]n response to the extrajudicial killings that occurred . . . , the 
foremost remedy to be provided by the State is an effective, 
swift investigation and judicial process, leading to the 
clarification of the facts, punishment of the responsible parties, 
and appropriate compensation of the victims.71 
 
It further recalled that the amnesty law, in any case, could not pose an 
obstacle to the investigation and prosecution of the alleged violations. 
In Gelman v. Uruguay,72 the Court analyzed the application of Uruguay’s 
Expiry Law, which prevented the investigation of the forced disappearance of 
Maria Claudia Gelman and other violations committed against the victims in the 
case.  The amnesty law, which covered police and security agents, had been 
upheld by Uruguay’s highest court and ratified in a referendum.  The Inter-
American Court reiterated its position on “the non-compatibility of amnesty laws 
related to serious human rights violations with international law and the 
international obligations of States.”73  The Court also made reference to article 
6.5 of Protocol II and cited with approval the ICRC’s interpretation that it does 
not apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity.  The Court also went to 
great lengths to point out that other jurisdictions, including UN treaty bodies, the 
European Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and domestic courts of members of the Organization of 
American States also have found proposed amnesty for serious human rights 
violations to be contrary to established international norms.  The Court cited as 
examples of serious violations “torture, summary, extrajudicial, or arbitrary 
executions, and enforced disappearance.”74  The Court further held that: 
 
[A]mnesty laws are, in cases of serious violations of human 
rights, expressly incompatible with the letter and spirit of the 
Pact of San José, given that they violate the provisions of 
Articles 1(1) and 2, that is, in that they impede the investigation 
and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights 
violations and, consequently, impede access to victims and their 
families to the truth of what happened and to the corresponding 
reparation, thereby hindering the full, timely, and effective rule 
of justice in the relevant cases.  This, in turn, favors impunity 
and arbitrariness and also seriously affects the rule of law, 
reason for which, in light of International Law, they have been 
declared to have no legal effect.75 
 
71 Id. ¶ 166(m). 
72 Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221 
(Feb. 24, 2011). 
73 Id. ¶ 195. 
74 Id. ¶ 225. 
75 Id. ¶ 226. 
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The Court continued, saying:  “[A]mnesty laws affect the international 
obligation of the State in regard to the investigation and punishment of serious 
human rights violations”76 and “[t]he incompatibility with the Convention 
includes amnesties of serious human rights violations . . . .”77  The Court declared 
without effect the Uruguayan Expiry Law, finding irrelevant the fact that the 
amnesty had been approved by popular referendum. 
Gomes Lund v. Brazil is one of the Inter-American Court’s most recent 
amnesty decisions involving the arbitrary detention, torture, and forced 
disappearance of members of the communist party and peasants during a military 
campaign to eradicate the guerrilla of Araguaia.78  The Court reiterated its ruling 
in cases, such as Almonacidad, Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, regarding the non-
applicability of amnesty in cases of grave human rights violations.  It then struck 
down the amnesty law declaring it without legal effect.  Later, the Court clarified 
that the “Amnesty Law . . . lacks legal effects regarding serious human rights 
violations.”79  Does this means that the amnesty would still be valid for other less 
serious political crimes?  The Court recognized as a positive step the creation of a 
truth commission, particularly in complying with the right to truth, but found that 
“the activities and information that this commission will eventually obtain do not 
substitute the obligation of the State to establish the truth and ensure the legal 
determination of individual responsibility by means of criminal legal 
procedures.”80 
In the next amnesty case, Massacre of El Mozote and nearby Places v. El 
Salvador,81 the Inter-American Court seemed to signal a willingness to depart, at 
least to some extent, from its earlier stance on amnesty.  The Court took into 
consideration the negotiation process that brought an end to the conflict citing, in 
several parts, the peace agreements.  The Court seemed to give serious 
consideration to the intent and objectives of the parties to the peace accord.  For 
example, it cited the terms of the peace accord regarding ending impunity and 
found that the amnesty law directly contradicted this objective and is therefore 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the peace accord.  The Court also took into 
account the fact that the amnesty arose in the context of an internal armed conflict 
to which Additional Protocol II applied and found it “pertinent”82 to analyze the 
compatibility of the amnesty with the American Convention “in light” of the 
provisions of Protocol II.83  The Court reiterated its position that amnesty is 
 
76 Id. ¶ 227. 
77 Id. ¶ 229. 
78 See generally Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.219 (Nov. 24, 2010). 
79 Id. ¶ 180. 
80 Id. 297. 
81 Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.225 (Oct. 25, 2012). 
82 Id. ¶ 284. 
83 The Court has held that the Geneva Conventions may be used as a tool of interpretation of the 
American Convention but cannot be used to attribute responsibility to states for their violations.  E.g., 
"Mapiripán Massacre" v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 134, ¶ 
115 (Sept. 15, 2005); Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 70, ¶ 209 
(Nov. 25, 2000); Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) 
No. 118, ¶ 119 (Nov. 23, 2004). 
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prohibited for grave human rights violations, such as war crimes, but left open the 
possibility that amnesty might be permissible in cases of lesser violations.  It 
ultimately found that the application of the amnesty law to the El Mozote case 
lacked legal effect because it violated the State’s obligation to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish grave human rights violations. 
The concurring decision of Judge Garcia-Sayan, signed by four other judges, 
was perhaps more reflective of the Court’s perceived shifting stance on amnesty.  
Judge Sayan made the case for looking at the context of the enactment of an 
amnesty and its objectives, particularly in situations of internal conflict, citing 
Article 6.5 of Protocol II.  For Judge Sayan, it was “necessary” for the Court to 
consider the peace accords and the provisions of Protocol II.84 
In its latest amnesty case, Garcia Lucero v. Chile, which again challenged the 
Chilean amnesty law, the Court reiterated its finding in Almonacidad that the 
amnesty law violates the American Convention, because it seeks to grant amnesty 
for crimes against humanity and prevents the investigation and punishment of 
those responsible.85  The Court however declined to decide on the validity of the 
amnesty law in this specific case because “it has not been proved that the mere 
existence of Decree Law No. 2.191 was the cause of the failure to open an 
investigation into what happened in the case of Mr. García Lucero . . . .”86 
The Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence on amnesty is not homogenous.  
The one consistent trend seems to be that amnesty is incompatible with the 
Convention if it concerns grave human rights violations, prevents the 
investigation, judgment, and punishment of perpetrators, and violates victims’ 
rights to reparations.87 
Given the lack of full clarity in the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence, it is 
hard to predict what kind of amnesty might withstand a challenge before the 
Court.  The main uncertainties concern:  (1) whether the Court’s position that 
amnesty is impermissible in cases of grave human rights violations means that it 
is permissible in cases of lesser violations; and (2) what violations are considered 
grave human rights violations.  Also unclear is how the Court would balance the 
right of victims, particularly the right to judicial guarantees and judicial 
protection, with the right to peace and the political objectives achieved by the 
amnesty. 
Given the Court’s perceived shifting stance on amnesty, however, it may well 
use the Colombian case to clarify its jurisprudence.  More interesting would be 
further development of the Court’s jurisprudence using the Geneva Conventions 
as a tool of interpretation of the American Convention.  Like in El Mozote, 
Protocol II also applies to the conflict in Colombia, and the Court is likely to 
analyze the Colombian amnesty “in light” of the Protocol’s provision on amnesty 
under Article 6.5, which allows amnesty for acts related to the participation in 
hostilities so long as they do not rise to the level of war crimes.  The decision in 
 
84 Massacres of El Mozote, Concurring Opinion of Judge Diego Garcia-Sayán, ¶ 10. 
85 García Lucero v. Chile, Preliminary Objection, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser.C) No. 267, ¶¶ 150, 154 (Aug. 28, 2013). 
86 García Lucero, ¶ 154. 
87 See Luigi Crema, Are Amnesties Still an Option? A Non-Policy Based Critique of the Inter-
American Approach, (The Center for Civil and Human Rights, University of Notre Dame, Working Paper 
No. 6, 2013). 
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El Mozote seems to suggest the Court’s willingness to go in that direction, and it 
may very well do so in the case of the Colombian amnesty. 
 
 
VI. THE DEFINITION OF POLITICAL CRIMES AND CRIMES THAT CAN BE 
CONSIDERED CONNECTED TO POLITICAL CRIMES FOR PURPOSES OF  
AMNESTY UNDER PROTOCOL II 
 
 
There is no generally accepted or authoritative definition of political crimes 
in international law.  The most reliable definition of the concept of political 
crimes is found in extradition law.  A political offense exception is found in 
almost all extradition treaties, and domestic courts are often called upon to 
interpret this definition.  Extradition law and domestic judicial interpretation are 
the principal sources for the “generally accepted and defensible definition of 
political [crimes].”88  For example, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission relied on the political offenses definition in extradition law to 
determine whether to grant amnesty.89  It is reported that the Commission relied 
on a survey of extradition law by the former president of the European 
Commission of Human Rights90 for the UN.91 
Based on this general approach under extradition treaties, we can identify two 
types of political crimes.  The first type is crimes against the state as an 
institution, such as treason, sedition, and espionage, which are “pure” political 
crimes.  The second type is “related political crimes,” which are ordinary crimes, 
sometimes even serious crimes such as murder, that become a political crime 
because “the perpetrator pursued some political purpose, [or] the act had some 
political consequence or was performed in a political context.”92 
When called upon to determine whether the political offense exception 
applies in extradition cases, domestic courts have developed three different 
approaches: 
 
 The objective approach looks at the nature of the act 
regardless of the context or the motivations of the actor and 
identifies some acts as purely political.  Under this 
approach, only acts that are defined as crimes against the 
 
88 Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of 
Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 173, 224 (2002). 
89 See Sam Garkawe, The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Suitable Model to 
Enhance the Role and Rights of the Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights?, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 
334, 353 (2003) (stating that the two main criteria for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s amnesty 
process were a result of “a survey of state practice in defining and applying the ‘political offence’ exception 
to extradition law”). 
90 Established in 1954, the European Commission on Human Rights considered cases first, before 
they went on to the European Court of Human Rights.  The Commission was abolished in 1998 and its 
functions were assumed by the Court.  International Justice Resource Center, European Court of Human 
Rights, http://www.ijrcenter.org/european-court-of-human-rights (last visited January 20, 2017). 
91 Slye, supra note 88, at 227. 
92 Johan Rautenbach, Namibia—The Release of Political Prisoners Revisited, 15 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 
148–49, (1989–90). 
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state, such as sedition and treason, qualify as political 
crimes. 
 The objective context approach looks at the context in 
which the act was committed—for example, in a conflict or 
uprising—and looks at the relationship between the act in 
question and the conflict.  In its narrowest version, this 
approach requires that the act be part of a power struggle to 
gain control of the state, but the mere fact that an act is 
committed with a motive to further some political cause is 
not enough to make it political for purposes of the 
exception.93 
 The subjective motive approach looks at the motivation of 
the actor, whether he or she committed the act out of 
political conviction or not.  This approach identifies both the 
political and common criminal aspects of the crime, and 
asks whether the political aspect outweighs the common 
criminal aspect when looking at the accused's motivation, 
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, 
and the proportionality between the political objectives 
pursued and the means employed. 
 
The first two objective tests are found mostly in common law systems, while 
the third subjective test is commonly found in civil law systems.94 
Another source of guidance for the definition of political crimes and crimes 
connected to political crimes are the Norgaard Principles, developed by and 
named for Carl Aage Norgaard, a Danish national and president of the European 
Commission on Human Rights who was asked at the time of the Namibian 
settlement to frame guidelines defining the concept of a political prisoner. 
For Norgaard, the quintessential element for a crime to be considered a 
political crime is the existence of a political motive.  One must look at the 
political advantage gained by committing the act, the specific act committed, and 
the “degree of connection between the criminal offence and the political 
element.”95  Moreover, “it is not essential that the person who actually carried out 
the offence should himself be politically motivated.  In this view, an offence 
committed under orders or duress may be political if its commission was procured 
for a political purpose.”96  There is no requirement that a crime be reasonable or 
necessary to be considered a political crime.  The following factors, dubbed the 
Norgaard Principles, are to be taken into account in determining whether an 
offense is political or not:  
 
(1) the motivation of the offender—that is, whether the crime 
was committed for a political or personal motive; 
 
93 Slye, supra note 88, at 224–25. 
94 Id. at 225. 
95 Rautenbach, supra note 92, at 150. 
96 Id. at 152. 
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(2) the circumstances in which the crime was committed, in 
particular whether it was committed in the course of or as 
part of a political uprising or disturbance; 
(3) the nature of the political objective, whether for instance it 
is an attempt to overthrow the government or force a change 
in policy; 
(4) the legal and factual nature of the crime, including its 
gravity; 
(5) the object of the crime—that is, whether it was committed 
against government personnel and property or directed 
primarily against private citizens and their property; and 
(6) the relationship between the crime and the political 
objective being pursued—for example, the directness, 
proximity, relationship or proportionality between the crime 
and the objective pursued.97 
 
Norgaard also argued that it is not enough that a crime was committed 
following orders or under duress for it to be a political crime.98  It is also 
important to analyze the connection between the act and the political objective, 
and whether the act actually furthers the political objective.  For example, a 
member of the rebel group in Namibia stayed at the house of a father and his 
sixteen-year-old daughter.99  The rebel was dressed in uniform and carried a 
weapon.  He sexually assaulted the daughter during the night.100  Norgaard found 
that, even if this man was a member of the rebel group, the particular act in 
question—that is, the assault—was not part of his rebel activities and there was 
no political motive attached to it.101  Therefore it could not be considered a 
political crime.  
 
 
VII. COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES IN AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL CRIMES UNDER 
PROTOCOL II 
 
 
We have selected a few examples of amnesties for political crimes that might 
shed helpful light on the concept, for purposes of analyzing the compatibility of 
the Colombian amnesty with Protocol II.  These amnesties are similar to the 
Colombian amnesty in that they were enacted in the context of a non-international 
armed conflict, were the result of a negotiated peace agreement without clear 
victors, and covered political crimes. 
This study is by no means exhaustive as there are many other examples of 
amnesties in non-international armed conflict that have not been included here.  
 
97 See Emily H. McCarthy, South Africa's Amnesty Process: A Viable Route Toward Truth and 
Reconciliation?, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 183, 209–210 (1997) (enumerating the Carl Aage Norgaard’s 
factors). 
98 See Rautenbach, supra note 92, at 153. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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None of these examples in our judgment constitutes a fully unobjectionable 
amnesty.  There are several aspects of these amnesties that are problematic in 
their conception and implementation.  Despite such imperfections, however, 
many lessons and good practices can be gleaned from these examples, which may 
be useful to the Colombian experience.  The study includes the amnesty laws of 
the following countries:  South Africa (1995); Ivory Coast (2003 and 2007); 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003, 2005, 2009 and, 2014); Senegal 
(2005); Angola (2002); El Salvador (1992); Kosovo (1999); and the Central 
African Republic (2008).  We identify major trends from the selected amnesties, 
discuss lessons learned, and draw some general connections with Colombia. 
 
A. Amnesty is Justified to Foster Peace and Reconciliation 
 
A true understanding of amnesty requires looking at the rationale behind the 
granting of the amnesty.  States grant amnesty to achieve peacekeeping, nation-
building, and reconciliation objectives.   Historically, states in conflict considered 
amnesty a necessary means to end wars, to maintain tranquility, and to establish 
democracy—or, at least, civilian rule.102  In this sense, amnesty can be understood 
as part of nation-building.103  The countries that we surveyed have all adopted 
amnesties under the rationale of achieving peace and reconciliation. 
The postscript of the Interim Constitution in South Africa expressly provided 
that amnesty would be granted to advance the goals of reconciliation and 
reconstruction of society.104  The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act of 1995 (the “Act”) which established the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) expressly stated that the objective of the TRC “shall be to 
promote national unity and reconciliation.”105  The decision by the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, in a challenge to the Act’s amnesty provisions, made clear 
the centrality of reconciliation as well as disclosure of the truth regarding past 
atrocities as the motivations for the amnesty regime.106  One of the justifications 
for the amnesty in South Africa was that the country was facing a military 
stalemate and neither side in the struggle—the state nor the liberation 
movements—had defeated the other, and hence nobody was in a position to 
enforce so-called victor’s justice.107 
Even if reconciliation is the stated purpose of an amnesty, it does not always 
achieve this result or is not perceived by the population as having done so.  A 
1998 study by South Africa's Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
 
102 Gwen K. Young, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.R. 427, 434 (2002). 
103 Id. at 436. 
104 See Marianne Geula, Note, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an Alternative 
Means of Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 62 
(2000) (discussing the postscript of the Interim Constitution in South Africa).  In relevant part, the 
postscript states: “In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in 
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of 
the conflicts of the past.” Id. (quoting S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993). 
105 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 ch. 2, § 3 (S. Afr.). 
106 See Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo) v. The President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
(8) BCLR 1015 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
107 See Gary J. Bass, War Crime Tribunals, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 229, 
236 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the creation of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation as a product of a military stalemate and lack of any “victor’s justice”). 
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and the Khulumani Support Group, which surveyed several hundred victims of 
human-rights abuse during the apartheid era, found that most felt that the TRC 
had failed to achieve reconciliation between the black and white communities.  
They believed that justice was a prerequisite for reconciliation rather than an 
alternative to it, and that the TRC had favored the perpetrators of abuse.108  Some 
critics of the TRC argued that its “strong emphasis on amnesty led to judgment of 
the actions of individuals, rather than the effects of the apartheid system as a 
whole.”109 
In El Salvador, the view was that there were no “losers” in the civil war.110  
The Salvadoran amnesty was thus seen as being an integral part of the country’s 
transition from war to peace.111  In Kosovo, one of the rationales for the 2013 
amnesty law112 following the war with Serbia was to facilitate peace by 
encouraging all Kosovars to forget about the wartime past and offering nearly 
everyone a clean slate and equal opportunities under Kosovar law.  The law 
pardoned local Serbs who agitated against the authority of Kosovo’s government 
after Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia in 2008.113  In the Ivory 
Coast, the overriding purpose of the amnesty law114 was to contribute to national 
reconciliation, stability of the country, and to move beyond the war by offering a 
clean slate and equal opportunities.  In Angola, the Lusaka Protocol, which 
brought a negotiated end to the conflict between the government and the rebel 
group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), included 
the provision of amnesty to all militants involved in the civil war.  Law 4/2002, 
which implemented the amnesty, specified that it was a “necessary legal and 
political guarantee for the promotion and fulfillment of the process of national 
reconciliation.”115 
The Central African Republic (CAR) passed a General Amnesty Law116 in 
September 2008 that granted amnesty for crimes committed by the government 
 
108 Jasmina Brankovic, Accountability and National Reconciliation in South Africa, 2 EDICIONES 
INFOJUS: DERECHOS HUMANOS, no. 4, 2013 at 55–86. 
109 Mich. State Univ., Exploring the Truth and Reconciliation Commission at 2, OVERCOMING 
APARTHEID, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-3&page=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 
2017).  
110 Kevin Dolliver, Steven Kanavel, & David Robeck, El Salvador’s Amnesty Law: A Monument to 
Impunity? (May 2, 2013) (capstone project, Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Program, George 
Washington University), https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/el-salvador-
amnesty-2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).  
111 Id. 
112 Ligjit Nr. 04/L-209 për amnistinë, GAZETA ZYRTARE E REPUBLIKËS SË KOSOVËS [G. ZYRTARE] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVA], 19 Sept. 2013 (Kos.), English translation available at 
https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=8895. 
113 Fatos Bytyci, Kosovo adopts amnesty for minority Serbs, REUTERS (July 11, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-serbia-amnesty-idUSBRE96A0P120130711. 
114 Loi 2003-309 du 8 août 2003, portant amnistie [Law 2003-309 of August 8, 2003 Granting 
Amnesty], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE [JORCI] [OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE IVORY COAST]. 
115 Lei No. 4/02 de 4 de Abril de 2002 DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA DE ANGOLA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
ANGOLA] (ser. 1). 
116 Loi 2008-020 du 13 octobre 2008 portant amnistie generale a l’endroit des personnalites, des 
militares, des elements et responsables civils des groups rebelles [Law 2008-020 of October 13, 2008 
Granting General Amnesty to Personalities, Military, Civilian Elements and Civilians of the Rebel Groups]; 
see also Law 2008-020 of October 13, 2008 (Cent. Afr. Rep.) translated in INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC—DÉJÀ-VU: PEACE (DIS)AGREEMENTS THAT ARE DETRIMENTAL TO 
VICTIMS 45–46 (2008), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/RCA513a2009.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
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and the rebel forces from March 2003—when forces loyal to former President 
Ange-Félix Patassé and rebel leader François Bozizé fought a bitter civil war—to 
the end.117  The General Amnesty Law was “[p]resented as a means of working 
towards national reconciliation and enabling all the protagonists in the conflict to 
take part in political dialogue.”118  The amnesty was passed pursuant to the last of 
several peace agreements reached between the State and various military bodies 
over 2007 to 2008.119  The granting of a general amnesty was seen by many as an 
essential precondition to ensuring an open dialogue in the peace process. 
 
B. Amnesty is a Tool for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
 
Several of the amnesties that we surveyed included as a benefit of the 
amnesty the reintegration of rebel fighters into mainstream politics or the 
military.  This was seen as a key component of the peace, as these rebel groups 
could now voice their grievances through the democratic process instead of taking 
up arms. 
In El Salvador, the amnesty had as a stated objective the incorporation of the 
guerilla forces into the legal political system.  Similarly, in Kosovo, the 2013 
amnesty law aimed at contributing to the integration of the Serbian minority into 
the existing Kosovo institutions.  In CAR, the General Amnesty Law was 
presented as a way of enabling all the protagonists in the conflict to take part in 
political dialogue. 
In Angola, UNITA’s leadership declared the rebel group a political party and 
officially demobilized its armed forces following the amnesty.  The Angolan 
government signed several agreements with rebel groups which allowed rebels to 
join the military or obtain senior positions in the government and state-run 
companies; a number of amnestied fighters of the Cabinda Enclave Liberation 
Front (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC), were 
incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, 
FAA).120  According to a report from Human Rights Watch,121 the Memorandum 
of Understanding of Luena, as the peace accord is known, provided for the 
reintegration and demobilization of ex-combatants who would receive certain 
benefits including, among other things, identity cards, five months’ salary, 
transportation stipends of $100, packages for resettlement with non-food 
products, and access to training courses. 
One of the conditions for individuals to receive amnesty under the Angolan 
law was presenting themselves to the Angolan authorities within forty-five days 
 
117 Law 2008-020 of October 13, 2008 (Cent. Afr. Rep.); see also INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 116, at 6–8; Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue, AFRICA BRIEFING 
No. 55 (Int’l Crisis Grp., Nairobi/Brussels), Dec. 9, 2008, at 6 (describing the application of the amnesty 
law to government and rebel forces). 
118 INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 116, at 31. 
119 See id. at 30–31 (outlining the timeline of the peace agreements with military bodies starting in 
Feb. 2007); see also Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue, supra note 117, at 6 
(discussing the history of the amnesty law). 
120 FAA Chief of Staff Urges Soldiers to Defend Nation´s Interests, ALLAFRICA (Jan. 8, 2007), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200701080832.html (last visited January 20, 2017). 
121 Nadejda Marques, Struggling Through Peace: Return and Resettlement in Angola, 15 HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH 16 (2003). 
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from the date the law became effective.  According to news reports, the time 
period was one of the most controversial aspects of the law, as some 
representatives felt that it did not give sufficient time to individuals who were 
internally displaced (of whom there were approximately two million), in 
weakened conditions, or those that had left the country.122 
A similar scenario took place in the CAR.  The amnesty law set rebel groups 
“a 60-day deadline ‘to end violence and adopt an immediate and unconditional 
ceasefire’ . . . [and] submit to arrangements for ‘gathering in assembly areas, for 
disarmament and reconversion.’”123  This is widely regarded as having been 
unrealistic.  It therefore had the consequence that rebel groups were denied 
amnesty while government forces benefited from it.124  These experiences 
demonstrate how timeframe, as well as the logistics for the amnesty, need to be 
carefully planned. 
Additionally, the great majority of the amnesties we surveyed included as 
conditions for granting the amnesty that the rebels lay down their weapons and 
renounce violence.  Some amnesties did not include these requirements such as 
the 2005 and 2009 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) amnesties. 
 
C. The Amnesty Excludes War Crimes, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and 
Other Grave Human Rights Violations 
 
The comparative study includes amnesties that were enacted both before and 
after the Rome Statute.  Of the countries surveyed, only El Salvador is subject to 
the Inter-American jurisprudence which states that amnesties are impermissible in 
cases of grave human rights violations.  We therefore observed a wide range of 
approaches in the way the amnesties dealt with the international law requirement 
that serious international crimes cannot be the subject of amnesty.  Some 
amnesties, as a product of the political and legal realities of their time, do not 
include such exceptions.  This approach is no longer possible given that the 
international norm on the impermissibility of amnesties for war crimes and grave 
human rights violations has now crystallized.  Other amnesties did include an 
exception for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  It is worth 
noting that only the amnesties that excluded these crimes, either as core or 
connected crimes, can be deemed to comply with Protocol II. 
The DRC has adopted three amnesty laws, all of which exclude war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity.  The 2014 amnesty law in the DRC also 
excludes “terrorism, offences of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
rape and other sexual offences, the use, conscription or enlisting of child soldiers 
and other widespread violations considered to be grave violations of human 
rights.”125  Also excluded from the ambit of the law are “misappropriation of 
 
122 Parlamento angolano aprova Lei da Anistia que permite o cessar-fogo da Unita [Angolan 
Parliament approves Amnesty Law that allows the Unita ceasefire], UOL ULTIMA NOTICIA (Luanda) (Apr. 
2, 2002), http://noticias.uol.com.br/lusa/ultnot/2002/04/02/ult611u10394.jhtm.  
123 Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue, supra note 117, at 6. 
124 See id. 
125 Loi 2014-006 du 11 février 2014 portant amnistie pour faits insurrectionnels, faits de guerre et 
infractions politiques [Law 2014-006 of Feb. 11, 2014 Granting Amnesty for Insurrectional Acts, Act of 
War and Political Offenses], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO [JORDC] 
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public funds and looting, as well as monetary exchange offences and drug 
trafficking.”126 
El Salvador's 1992 Law of National Reconciliation provided that amnesty 
would be excluded for persons who, according to the Truth Commission, 
participated in grave acts of violence.127  Upon the publication of the 
Commission’s report revealing that several members of the army, the courts, and 
even the President had taken part in such grave violations, a new law was adopted 
providing for blanket amnesty for all crimes, including grave violations.  Here, 
we only purport to use the original version of the law enacted in 1992, which 
excludes grave violations, and not the amended 1993 version.128  It is worth 
recalling the Inter-American Court’s decision in the case of El Mozote, which 
involved the 1993 version of the Salvadoran amnesty law.  The Court did not 
repeal the amnesty law but found that it could not be applied to the facts in the 
case.129  Moreover, there is the concurring opinion of Judge Garcia Sayan, which 
encourages looking at the context and circumstances surrounding the passing of 
amnesty laws, particularly when they involved a negotiated end to a conflict.130 
In Kosovo, the amnesty law excludes acts that constitute serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and criminal offenses that result in grievous bodily 
injury or death.131  In the Ivory Coast, the amnesty excludes offenses that 
constitute serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, 
offenses classified by the Ivorian Penal Code as crimes, and offenses against the 
law of nations.132 
In the CAR, the amnesty excludes genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes.  Article 7 also set out additional exclusions: 
 
 Those who have voluntarily carried out acts of robbery, 
rape, looting, burning, voluntary destruction, sabotage, 
hindrance of freedom of movement; 
 Those who have voluntarily committed . . . murders, . . . 
assault or battery, . . . acts of violence, threats, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or any other violation of the 
 
[OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO] art. 4, Feb. 11, 2014 (translation provided 
by the author).  The original French states, “[L]e terrorisme, les infractions de torture, de traitements cruels, 
inhumains ou dégradants, les infractions de viol et autres violences sexuelles, l’utilisation, la conscription 
ou l’enrôlement d’enfants et toutes autres violations graves, massives et caractérisées des droits humains.”  
Id. 
126 Id. (translation provided by the author).  The original French states, “Sont également exclus, les 
infractions de détournement des derniers public et de pillage, de même que les infractions à la 
réglementation de change et le trafic des stupéfiants.” 
127 Decreto No. 147, 23 Jan. 1992, Ley De Reconciliacion Nacional [Law of National Reconciliation], 
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], art. 6, 23 Jan. 1992 (El Sal.). 
128 In July 2016, the Constitutional Chamber of El Salvador’s Supreme Court declared the 1993 
amnesty law unconstitutional in part because it grants amnesty for conducts that may constitute crimes 
against humanity or war crimes in violation of international law including Protocol II.  See, e.g., 44-
2013AC, de las 12:00 p.m., 13 July 2016, Sala de lo Constitucional, D.O, [Constitutional Chamber] p. 144 
(El Sal.). 
129 See Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.225 (Oct. 25, 2012). 
130 See generally id. (Sayan, J., concurring). 
131 Ligjit Nr. 04/L-209 për amnistinë, G. ZYRTARE ch. II, art. 4 §§ 1.2–1.3, 19 Sept. 2013 (Kos.), 
English translation available at https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=8895. 
132 Law 2003-309 of August 8, 2003 Granting Amnesty, art. 4 (Côte d’Ivoire). 
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physical or moral integrity of a human being and 
property.133 
 
D. Amnesty for Political Crimes 
 
All of the selected amnesties applied to political crimes; some of the laws 
explicitly use the term political crimes, but others do not.  For those that do not 
specifically refer to political crimes, we can infer from the nature of the acts 
described in the amnesty that they indeed were referring to political crimes.  
These selected amnesties therefore provide an interesting comparison of the types 
of crimes that can be considered political crimes for the purpose of amnesty under 
Protocol II, as long as they do not constitute war crimes or grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions.  Moreover, when available, we look at the interpretation of 
these provisions by domestic and international courts, as well as truth and 
reconciliation commissions, to get a better understanding of the nature of the 
crimes that can be deemed political or connected to political crimes. 
In the DRC, the 2003134 and 2005135 amnesties cover “acts of war [and] 
political and opinion breaches of the law.”   “[A]cts of war” are “acts inherent to 
military operations authorized by the laws and customs of war, which, during the 
war, have caused injury to another person”136 while “war crimes” are defined as 
“all breaches of the laws of the DRC committed during the war and which are not 
authorized by the laws and customs of war.”137  The distinction between acts of 
war and war crimes, therefore, is between those acts that are authorized by the 
laws and customs of war (acts of war), and those that are not (war crimes).  The 
2009 Amnesty Law covers, in addition to acts of war, acts of insurgency, which 
are defined as acts of collective violence that threaten the institutions of the State 
or its territorial integrity.138  The 2005 Amnesty Law includes as political crimes 
illegal actions against the state or public administration committed with a political 
motive or when the circumstances surrounding the act are of a political nature.139  
 
133 Law 2008-020 of October 13, 2008 (Cent. Afr. Rep.) translated in INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 116, at 46. 
134 Loi 2003-001 du 15 avril 2003 portant amnistie pour faits de guerre, infractions politiques et 
d’opinion [Law 2003-001 of Apr. 15, 2003 Granting Amnesty For Acts of War, Political and Opinion 
Breaches of Law], JORDC, Apr. 17, 2003, p. 3 (Dem. Rep. Congo) (translation provided by the author). 
135 Loi 2005-023 du 19 decembre 2005 portant amnistie pour faits de guerre, infractions politiques et 
d’opinion [Law 2005-023 of Dec. 19, 2005 Granting Amnesty For Acts of War, Political and Opinion 
Breaches of Law] (Dem. Rep. Congo) (translation provided by the author). 
136 Id. (translation provided by the author). 
137 Loi 2002-024 du 18 novembre 2002 portant code penale militaire [Law 2002-024 of Nov. 18, 2002 
Military Penal Code], JORDC ch. III, Nov. 18, 2002, art. 173 (Dem. Rep. Congo) (translation provided by 
the author). The original French version states, “Par crime de guerre, il faut entendre toutes infractions aux 
lois de la République commises pendant la guerre et qui ne sont pas justifiées par les lois et coutumes de la 
guerre.”  Id. 
138 Loi 2009-003 du 7 mai 2009 portant amnistie pour faits de guerres et insurrectionnels commis dans 
les provinces du nord-kivu et du sud-kivu [Law 2009-003 of May 7, 2009 Granting Amnesty for Acts of 
War and Insurrections Committed in the Provinces of North Kivu and Sout Kivu], JORDC, MAY 7, 2009, 
art. 2 (Dem. Rep. Congo), (translation provided by the author).  The original French version states, “[F]ait 
insurrectionnels, les actes de violence collective de nature à mettre en péril les institutions de la République 
ou à porter atteinte a l’intégralité du territoire national.”  Id. 
139 Law 2005-023 of Dec. 19, 2005 (Dem. Rep. Congo) (translation provided by the author).  The 
original French version states, “[L]es actes illégaux d’administration ou de gestion du territoire dont le 
mobile et/ou les circonstances revêtent un caractère politique.”  Id. 
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We can see that these amnesties look at the nature and circumstances of the act to 
determine whether or not it is political.  This is similar to the subjective motive 
approach we discussed earlier.  One interesting feature of the DRC 2005 amnesty 
is that it “allowed for the retroactive pardon and commutation of convictions for 
the acts falling under the amnesty law.”140 
In South Africa, the amnesty law used the term “acts associated with a 
political objective,” rather than the term “political crimes.”  An “act associated 
with a political objective” is defined as “any act or omission which constitutes an 
offence or delict, which, according to criteria specified in subsection (3), is 
associated with a political objective, and which was advised, planned, directed, 
commanded, ordered or committed within or outside the Republic.”141  The 
criteria listed in subsection (3) are: 
 
(a) The motive of the person who committed the act, ommission 
or offence; 
(b) the context in which the act, omission or offence took place, 
and in particular whether the act, omission or offence was 
committed in the course of, or as part of, a political uprising, 
disturbance or event, or in reaction thereto;  
(c) the legal and factual nature of the act, omission or offence, 
including the gravity of the act, omission or offence; 
(d) the object or objective of the act, omission or offence, and in 
particular whether the act, omission or offence was 
primarily directed at a political opponent, State property, 
personnel, or against private property or individuals; 
(e) whether the act, omission or offence was committed in the 
execution of an order of, or on behalf of, or with the 
approval of, the organization, institution, liberation 
movement or body of which the person who committed the 
act was a member, an agent or a supporter; and; 
(f) the relationship between the act, omission or offence and the 
political objective pursued, and in particular the directness 
and proximity of the relationship and the proportionality of 
the act, omission or offence to the objective pursued . . . .142 
 
Subsection (3) also excludes from the definition of “act associated with a 
political objective” any act, omission, or offense committed by any person who 
acted 
 
(i.) for personal gain:  [P]rovided that an act, omission or 
offence by any person who acted and received money or 
anything of value as an informer of the state or a former 
state, political organisation or liberation movement, shall 
 
140 DRC Amnesty Law: Amnesty must not Equal Impunity, FOCUS: 2009 (Int’l Ctr. for Transitional 
Just., New York, N.Y.), 2009, at 1. 
141 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 ch. 4, § 20(2) (S. Afr.). 
142 Id. § 20(3). 
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not be excluded only on the grounds of that person having 
received money or anything of value for his or her 
information; or 
(ii.) out of personal malice, ill-will or spite, directed against the 
victim of the acts committed.143 
 
The South African model is by far the most detailed in terms of its definition 
of political crimes in the text of an amnesty law itself and the inclusion of the 
criteria for determining if an act is a political crime or not.  The model resembles 
closely the Norgaard principles and the subjective motive approach we saw 
earlier.  Based on this model, South Africa’s TRC Amnesty Committee granted 
amnesty for violent offenses that involved “political crimes” (such as, for 
example, sabotage, bombings of government installations, abductions of political 
opponents,144 arms smuggling,145 and similar offenses).  Other crimes for which 
the amnesty was granted included: 
 
 Assassinations and attempted assassinations of police 
officers, political leaders or opponents and other persons; 
 murders and attempted murders of civilians accused of 
being informers or collaborators with police or the state 
security forces; 
 abductions, attempted abductions, and unlawful detentions 
by personnel of the police or state security forces or of other 
organizations; 
 other acts of public violence, including:  bombings and 
attempted bombings of police stations, railway lines, 
military targets, other governmental targets, arson, and other 
malicious damage to government property or other property; 
 acts of sabotage against the government and infrastructure 
and related installations, including those involving electrical 
systems and oil refineries;  
 smuggling of weapons into South Africa or the unlawful 
possession, storage, or distribution of firearms or other 
weapons or of ammunition by personnel of the state security 
forces, members of anti-apartheid organizations, or other 
persons; 
 
143 Id. 
144 See generally TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT § 3 ch. 1 at 181–263 (2003) (discussing the widespread use of 
abductions of political opponents as a tactic during the South African conflict, including by (among others) 
members of the South Africa Security Forces, by the African National Congress (ANC) and its allied 
organizations and self-defense units, by the Inkatha Freedom Party, by members of extreme right-wing 
organizations, and to a lesser extent by persons involved in “street justice” or “people’s courts” initiatives.). 
145 See id. § 3 ch. 2 at 264–337.  In a number of cases the Amnesty Committee granted amnesty for 
illegal movement into or out of South Africa of weapons and explosives.  These amnesty applications, 
which were handled by the Amnesty Committee without a hearing (as arms smuggling on its own does not 
involve gross violations of human rights), were submitted most often by members of the South African 
security forces, but some applications were also submitted by members or supporters of the ANC or its 
related organizations. 
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 armed robberies and attempted robberies of money, firearms 
and other property from banks, other businesses, 
universities, government institutions, white farmers, and 
other victims, including members of rival political 
organizations. 
 
Many of the armed robberies and attempted robberies for which amnesty was 
granted involved the robbery of cash and other property for the express purpose 
of financing the operations of the political organizations of which the applicants 
were members or supporters, in compliance with the policies of the organizations 
and upon instructions by their leadership.  The Amnesty Committee granted 
amnesty in these cases where the evidence supported the conclusion that the 
applicants committed the thefts in compliance with the policies of the 
organization of which the applicants were members or with a bona fide belief that 
committing the offenses would advance the political struggle waged by their 
political organization, whereas amnesty was refused when the Committee 
concluded that the applicant had been acting for reasons of personal gain.146 
We should note that the South African TRC was heavily criticized for 
allowing certain parties “to get away with murder” and failing to apply the criteria 
for amnesty in an even-handed manner and without regard to the notoriety of the 
applicants or status of the victims.147 
Law N° 2005-05 dated 17 February 2005,148 also known as the “Ezzan” Law 
in Senegal, grants amnesty to those persons who had participated in the 
assassination of a Constitutional Court judge during the contested 1993 legislative 
elections and a violent attack on a political figure in 2003.149  The law is 
applicable to all crimes, as long as they were committed in relation to general or 
local elections, and had a political motive.  It applies also to persons already 
convicted.  In Senegal, we see one of the broadest languages for amnesty.  The 
amnesty law applies to all crimes or misdemeanors committed in Senegal or 
abroad related to the elections if the act was committed with a political motive.  
Again, we see the political motive requirement.  The law also states that those 
who benefit from the amnesty do not incur the right to be reinstituted into their 
posts within the public administration. 
In El Salvador, the 1992 amnesty law extended to “every person that has 
participated as immediate authors, mediate authors, and accomplices in the 
 
146 See, e.g., Thabo Paulos Mtjikelo 1998 AC/98/0020 (S. Afr.); Zakhele Jan Simelane 1999 
AC/99/0209 (S. Afr.); Mlungiseleli Cyves Ndamane 1999 AC/99/0231 (S. Afr.); Sithembele Micheal Khala 
1999 AC/99/0310 (S. Afr.).  Amnesty was also granted for armed robberies involving theft of weapons and 
ammunition on the instruction of leadership of the political organization, including armed robberies by self-
defense unit members of police stations.  See, e.g., Cyril Chisoma 2000 AC/2000/139 (S. Afr.). 
147 See Nick Childs, South Africa Concludes Healing Process, B.B.C. (May 31, 2001, 9:56 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1363184.stm (discussing the varying perceptions of the TRC at the time). 
148 Loi 2005-05 du 17 février 2005 portant loi d’amnistie [Law 2005-05 of Feb. 17, 2005 Amnesty 
Law], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU SENEGAL [JOS] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF SENEGAL], Feb. 17, 2005 (Sen.). 
149 Article 1 states, “Amnesty is granted, as of right, for all criminal or correctional offenses 
committed, either in Senegal or abroad, in relation to the general or local elections that were committed 
with a political motivation, between 1 January 1983 and 31 December 2004, whether or not their 
perpetrators were tried.”  Id. at art. 1 (translation provided by the author); see also Tidiane Sy, Senegal 
Opposition to Amnesty Law, B.B.C. (Jan. 11, 2005, 7:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
4166291.stm. 
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commission of political common crimes and those related to them, and in 
common crimes committed by over twenty people, except for the commission of 
the crime of kidnapping.”150  There is no explanation for why kidnapping was 
excluded from the amnesty.  We wonder if this is another example of the 
sensitivity towards kidnapping because of how prevalent it was during the 
conflict and how much it affected the population.  Although not particularly more 
heinous than other crimes that may be included under the definition, kidnapping 
may have been a particularly unpopular crime in El Salvador. The amnesty also 
covered bribery and conflicts of interest of public officers, murder, infanticide, 
abortion, insurrection, sedition, and conspiracy.151  In El Salvador, we see one 
example of murder as a crime connected to political crimes.  The 1992 
Salvadoran amnesty also applied to handicapped and non-combating members of 
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front152 who were outside the country, 
and were taken into custody for political crimes.153   
In Kosovo, the amnesty law covered, among others, goods smuggling and tax 
evasion.154  To its north, Kosovo borders with Serbia—of which it previously was 
a part—and this area is mostly populated by ethnic Serbs.  With the collapse of 
the socialist regime, the region was in great chaos.  Goods smuggling from one 
country to the other was a daily occurrence, and, for many, was the only source of 
revenue.155  Moreover, in light of Serbia’s continued refusal to acknowledge 
Kosovo’s independence, many would argue that there was no actual border, as 
Kosovo—even after the independence was declared—was not an independent 
state.156  As for tax evaders, those Kosovo Serbs who did not recognize the new 
state did not pay taxes.  In addition to goods smuggling and tax evasion, the 
Kosovo amnesty law applies to the following crimes:  misuse of economic 
authorizations, prohibited trade, and avoiding payment of mandatory custom 
fees.157 
Kosovo thus is a good illustration of how amnesty can include economic 
crimes as well as political crimes.  Other crimes that are relevant in the 
Colombian context and are included in the Kosovar amnesty include the 
following:  armed rebellion; endangering the territorial integrity of Kosovo; 
endangering the constitutional order by destroying or damaging public 
installations and facilities; espionage; alliance for anti-constitutional actions; 
 
150 Decreto No. 147, 23 Jan. 1992, Ley De Reconciliacion Nacional [Law of National Reconciliation], 
D.O, art. 1, 23 Jan. 1992 (El Sal.) (translation provided by the author). 
151 Id. 
152 A left-wing guerilla group that opposed government forces during El Salvador’s civil war.  El 
Salvador, 12 Years of Civil War, THE CENTER FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE, http://cja.org/where-
we-work/el-salvador/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
153 Decreto No. 147, 23 Jan. 1992, Ley De Reconciliacion Nacional [Law of National Reconciliation], 
D.O, arts. 3–4, 23 Jan. 1992 (El Sal.). 
154 Ligjit Nr. 04/L-209 për amnistinë, G. ZYRTARE ch. II, art. 3, 19 Sept. 2013 (Kos.), English 
translation available at https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=8895. 
155 See Kosovo’s Smugglers Mourn End of Golden Age, BALKANINSIGHT (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-s-smugglers-mourn-end-of-golden-age/1589/5 (last visited 
on Jan. 11, 2016) (discussing the lucrative nature of the smuggling between Serbia and Kosovo after 
NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo War of 1998–1999). 
156 See Marc Champion, Recognize Kosovo or Pay the Price, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29, 2016, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-29/recognize-kosovo-or-pay-the-price?. 
157 Ligjit Nr. 04/L-209 për amnistinë, supra note 154, art. 3. 
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inciting national, racial, religious or ethnic hatred, discord, or intolerance; 
unauthorized ownership, control, or possession of weapons; and obstructing 
officials in performing official duties and attacking them. 
The 2003 amnesty law in the Ivory Coast covers crimes such as attack against 
State authorities and public order, disturbance of public order, participation in 
armed gangs, unlawful possession of arms, organization of armed gangs, and 
murder.158  Here again we see a mix of “pure political crimes” and crimes 
connected to political crimes, such as murder.  The Ivorian law has an interesting 
feature in that it excludes “economic offences,”159 which include compromising 
trust of the public in the national economy, any form of theft, pillage or 
misappropriation of foodstuffs or goods, and destruction or misappropriation of 
agricultural products.160 
As in the majority of the amnesty laws we surveyed, the Angolan law does 
not specifically refer to “political crimes” but we can infer by the nature of the 
crimes covered that they are “political crimes.”  The law applies to “all crimes 
against the security of the State committed in the context of the Angolan armed 
conflict” and “all military crimes . . . except for violent crimes that result in death 
included in section 3 of article 18 and in section 3 of article 19 of Law 4/94 of 28 
January . . . .”161  These sections refer to military crimes against a superior officer 
or a subordinate officer that result in death.  There is no clear reason for these 
exclusions. 
In the CAR, the amnesty law extends to crimes such as threatening state 
security or national defense and for related defenses, embezzlement of public 
funds, and assassinations and complicity in assassinations.162  The amnesty also 
applies to people in exile.163 
 
E. Amnesty and Reparations 
 
The countries we surveyed had a mixed approach regarding reparations.  
Some amnesty laws preclude victims from recovering civil damages or monetary 
reparations while others leave open the possibility of civil damages.  For 
example, in the DRC, the 2005 and 2009 amnesty laws do not prejudice the 
victims’ ability to recover civil damages, particularly for damages to property.164 
In South Africa, the amnesty was deemed to extinguish civil, as well as 
criminal, liability.165  Both the Appellate Court and the Constitutional Court 
 
158 Law 2003-309 of August 8, 2003, art. 3 (Côte d’Ivoire). 
159 Id. art. 4(a). 
160 Id. art. 4(c). 
161 Lei No. 4/02 de 4 de Abril de 2002 DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA DE ANGOLA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
ANGOLA] (ser. 1) art. 1(1) and 1(3).  
162 See Law 2008-020 of October 13, 2008 (Cent. Afr. Rep.) translated in INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 116, at 45. 
163 Id. 
164 See Law 2005-023 of Dec. 19, 2005 (Dem. Rep. Congo) (translation provided by the author); law 
2009-003 of May 7, 2009, pmbl. (Dem. Rep. Congo) (translation provided by the author). 
165 Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo) and Others v. The President of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) paras. 6–7 (S. Afr.).  
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confirmed this interpretation of the amnesty law in the Azapo case.166  The 
amnesty law provided that the TRC would 
 
make recommendations to the President [of South Africa] with regard 
to (i) the policy which should be followed or measures which should 
be taken with regard to the granting of reparation to victims or the 
taking of other measures aimed at rehabilitating and restoring the 
human and civil dignity of victims, [and] (ii) measures which should 
be taken to grant urgent interim reparation to victims.167 
 
The Act established the TRC’s Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation 
(RRC) to perform these functions.168  As part of its final report, the TRC 
submitted to the government a document entitled A Summary of Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Policy, Including Proposals to be Considered by the President.169  
That document further explains that only those who made statements to the TRC, 
or were referred to in another person’s statement to the TRC, can be considered 
for reparations;170 this is a provision which has proved quite controversial and 
which continues to be challenged today.  In general, there has been much 
criticism of South Africa’s implementation of the TRC’s recommendations on 
reparations.  Of the countries that have implemented reparations based on truth 
commission recommendations, South Africa is said to be the only country to have 
restricted reparations only to those registered as victims by the TRC, thereby 
limiting compensation to approximately 17,000 victims when the real number of 
victims is said to be much higher.171  These victims have been excluded from the 
process without redress.172  The government has also been criticized for failing to 
make a comprehensive assessment of the needs of the victims; however, the 
efforts of victims’ groups to persuade the government to reopen registration for 
victims have not been met with success thus far.173 
In El Salvador, the various negotiations that led to the 1992 amnesty did not 
include reparations for victims.  It is the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador 
that, in its report entitled De la Locura a la Esperanza, made recommendations 
for reparations for victims and their families, namely moral and material 
reparations.174  In Senegal, the amnesty law does not prevent victims or third 
 
166 Id. para 50.  
167 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 ch. 2, § 4(f) (S. Afr.). 
168 Id. § 23. 
169 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., A SUMMARY OF REPARATION AND 
REHABILITATION POLICY, INCLUDING PROPOSALS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE PRESIDENT, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/reparations/summary.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
170 Id. § 2(2). 
171 See Sufiya Bray, Reparation in South Africa: the ‘unfinished business’ of the TRC, TRUTH AND 
MEMORY (July 8, 2014), http://www.khulumani.net/truth-memory/item/979-article-on-the-unfinished-
business-of-reparations-in-south-africa-in-the-pan-african-reparation-perspectives-bulletin.html. 
172 Id.  
173 See Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Just., Ignoring Cries for Justice, South Africa Fails Victims of 
Apartheid-era Crimes, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Jan. 7, 2013), 
https://www.ictj.org/news/ignoring-cries-justice-south-africa-fails-victims-apartheid-era-crimes. 
174 U.N. TRUTH COMM’N, DE LA LOCURA A LA ESPERANZA: LA GUERRA DE 12 AÑOS EN EL 
SALVADOR [FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE 12 YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR] (1993). 
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parties from seeking damages before civil courts.  In Angola, no reparations were 
included in the amnesty law. 
Reparations for victims were not included in the Kosovo amnesty law.  That 
said, Article 5 of the law reads that “[t]he granting of amnesty shall not affect the 
rights of third parties which are based upon a sentence or a judgment.”175  
Interpreting the law, the Constitutional Court held that “the perpetrators of 
amnestied offenses having caused damage to third parties should remain 
accountable for paying compensation to the victims who should have an efficient 
and effective legal remedy to satisfy their rights” 176 and that “in certain classes of 
criminal offences foreseen to benefit from amnesty, where damage to property 
has been caused to individuals, these provisions of the Law on Amnesty 
effectively violate the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions as 
protected by Article 1 First Protocol of the [European Convention on Human 
Rights].”177  Other than these provisions, the law is silent on the issue of 
reparations to victims. 
In the Ivory Coast, the amnesty law provides that “[i]n the interest of national 
reconciliation and national solidarity, the State shall ensure, through all relevant 
means, reparation for damages caused by the offences covered by this Amnesty 
Act.  The methods of compensation, reparation and rehabilitation shall be 
determined by the law.”178  A Commission Dialogue Vérité et Réconciliation was 
created for the purpose of compensating the victims of the conflicts.179 
The amnesty law in the CAR provides that the amnesty “does not prejudice 
the civil interests of victims”180 and requires that the related criminal file be made 
available to parties in civil proceedings, and that any criminal court seized by 
order or remand before the promulgation of the law retains jurisdiction over the 
civil interests of victims.181  However, the international non-government 
organization (NGO), the International Federation for Human Rights, has noted 
that this provision is “unrealistic” as no positive step towards reparations was 
taken.182  Courts lack the political will or ability to make adverse findings, and 
victims are in any event afraid to come forward.183 
There does not seem to be a uniform approach on reparations and particularly 
civil damages, or the right of third parties to recover damages after the enactment 
of amnesty laws.  Some countries preserved that right while others did not.  It 
would be interesting to see to what extent, in cases where victims or third parties 
could seek damages, they have availed themselves of that right and to what extent 
it endangered the amnesty or the reconciliation sought to be achieved by the 
amnesty. 
 
 
175 Ligjit Nr. 04/L-209 për amnistinë, G. ZYRTARE ch. II, art. 5, 19 Sept. 2013 (Kos.), English 
translation available at https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=8895. 
176 Constitutional Court Sept. 3 2013, KO 108/13 para. 120 (Kos.). 
177 Id. para. 154. 
178 Law 2003-309 of August 8, 2003, art. 10 (Côte d’Ivoire). 
179 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TO CONSOLIDATE THIS PEACE OF OURS: A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE (Dec. 2015), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/cdi1215_4up.pdf.  
180 INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 116, at 33. 
181 Id. at 34. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 34–35. 
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F. Criticism/Limitations of Amnesties for Political Crimes and the Political 
Crimes Definition 
 
One key issue that surfaced in studying amnesty laws enacted in other 
countries under circumstances similar to Colombia’s is the need for greater clarity 
in the definition of the political crimes covered under amnesty laws.  Amnesty 
laws tend to be worded in vague terms, and in many cases, this has led to abuses 
of the law where conduct that may not fall under the amnesty laws is still 
amnestied because the terms of the laws are so vague.  Moreover, the vagueness 
also leads to a misperception on the part of the population that the amnesty is a 
form of impunity or that the beneficiaries are “getting away with murder.”  This is 
even more important since most amnesties are implemented within deeply 
divided communities that are still recovering from the abuses committed during 
the conflict.  The need for clarity in defining political crimes and crimes 
connected to political crime is evident in the experiences of these selected 
countries. 
Clarity is even more important when the amnesty is purportedly adopted 
under Protocol II.  In fact, Article 6.5 of Protocol II, which encourages amnesty, 
is quite restrictive.  It encourages amnesty for political crimes only—that is, those 
crimes related to the conduct of hostilities.  Therefore, the amnesty that Protocol 
II calls for does not extend to war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, or crimes against humanity and genocide.  A political crime that is 
also a war crime or a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions cannot be 
amnestied under Protocol II.  This extends to crimes connected to political 
crimes.  Even if the core political crime is not a war crime, if the connected crime 
is, it cannot be amnestied under Protocol II. 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the vagueness of the 
amnesty laws has led to a perception that these laws have perpetuated and even 
encouraged impunity.  Moreover, Congolese legislation does not define political 
crimes.  Vague penal and military laws have resulted in the amnesty laws 
covering a much broader scope, resulting in blanket immunity.184  Some critics 
have observed that members of the military and rebel groups have been involved 
in atrocity crimes that would be excluded under the amnesty laws.  Nevertheless, 
due to the vagueness of the law, they could still argue that their actions are 
political, and therefore covered by the amnesty laws.185  The amnesty laws are 
thus perceived as protecting perpetrators of grave violations. 
In El Salvador, the Inter-American Commission  criticized the definition of 
political crimes included in the amnesty—namely, crimes committed by twenty or 
more people and connected to the armed conflict.186  It considered that such a 
 
184 See TYRONE SAVAGE, INST. FOR SECURITY STUD. AFR. PAPER 130, IN QUEST OF A SUSTAINABLE 
JUSTICE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 5–
6 (2006). 
185 PATRICIA PINTO SOARES, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN SEARCH OF ITS PURPOSE 
AND IDENTITY 183 (TRIESTINO MARINIELLO ed., 1st. ed. 2015). 
186 COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS], INFORME ANNUAL DE LA COMISIOÓN INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 1992–
1993 [ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1992–1993] (Mar. 12, 
1993), https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/92span/cap.4a.htm (translation provided by the author). 
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broad definition would impair the effort to end the culture of impunity in El 
Salvador.187  This is another illustration of the importance of having a clear 
definition of the crimes that are covered by the amnesty and of ensuring that these 
definitions be compatible with domestic and international law. 
Broad and vague language leads to broad interpretation, resulting in more 
crimes than originally intended being included in the amnesty, thereby increasing 
the perception that the amnesty is a form of impunity.  When people can see 
exactly what is and is not included in the amnesty, they understand better that the 
amnesty is a limited measure that does not apply to all crimes. 
Another issue with the vague and broad language of amnesty laws in relation 
to the crimes they cover is that, in most of the jurisdictions we surveyed, there is 
no definition of political crimes in the criminal codes or other domestic 
instruments.  (This was the case, for example, in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Senegal, and El Salvador).  This leaves open to interpretation the concept 
of political crimes. 
 
G. Amnesties Have Limited Temporal Scope 
 
All of the amnesties in the countries we surveyed were limited in temporal 
scope.  In South Africa, applicants could apply for amnesty for any act, omission, 
or offense associated with a political objective committed between March 1, 1960 
and December 5, 1993 (the date the final agreement was reached in the political 
negotiations);188 the cut-off date was later extended to May 10, 1994 (the date of 
the inauguration of the first democratically elected president in South Africa).189  
In Senegal, the amnesty law only applied to actions that took place between 
January 1, 1983 and December 31, 2004.190  In the Ivory Coast, amnesty was also 
limited to criminal offenses committed from September 17, 2000 to September 
19, 2002.191 
 
H. Amnesties and Due Process Guarantees 
 
In South Africa, any party aggrieved by a decision of the TRC had the right 
to approach the South African High Court for a review of the decision.  The court 
is not meant to consider whether the decision is correct, but rather whether it is 
justifiable.  It does not retry the matter, but simply concerns itself with whether 
the Commission’s decision is justifiable in the sense that there is a rational 
connection between the facts of the particular application and the decision.  The 
review court, however, does consider the merits of the application in order to 
decide whether the rational connection has actually been established.192  In 
Kosovo, citizens were able to challenge the amnesty law all the way to the 
 
187 Id. (translation provided by the author). 
188 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 ch. 4, § 20(7)(c) (S. Afr.). 
189  6 AMNESTY COMMITTEE, THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE AMNESTY PROCESS 1–8 (2003). 
190 Law 2005-05 of Feb. 17, 2005 (Sen.) (translation provided by the author). 
191 Law 2003-309 of August 8, 2003, art. 3 (Côte d’Ivoire). 
192 AMNESTY COMMITTEE, supra note 189, at 15–16. 
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constitutional courts.193  In the case of Senegal, the law was referred to the 
African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights by local and international 
NGOs claiming violation of the right to a fair trial.194  However, the complaint 
was ruled inadmissible by the Commission on the ground that the applicants had 
failed to exhaust all national remedies before making the application.195 
 
I. Support of the International Community for the Amnesty 
 
The international community has for the most part been in favor of amnesties 
for political crimes in the context of a negotiated end to a non-international armed 
conflict for the objective of achieving peace and reconciliation. 
The 2005 and 2009 amnesties in the Democratic Republic of Congo received 
support from the international community, including regional African neighbors 
and the UN, which was involved in brokering the accord in the first place.  These 
observers recognized that the amnesty was necessary in order to achieve peace.196  
Indeed, the UN Security Council and other UN bodies, the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), and the UN 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) all 
played a key role in brokering the 2002 Transition Agreement.197  The 2009 
Goma Peace Agreement included heavy involvement, and therefore support, of 
the UN, the United States, and the European Union (E.U.).198 
In El Salvador, the UN played a key role in the negotiations that led to the 
amnesty.  The Truth Commission, which was created under the amnesty law, was 
also set up by the UN and received its support during its operation.199  The 
Commission was made up of three international commissioners, appointed by the 
Secretary-General of the UN200  
In Kosovo, the E.U. and United States representatives voiced strong support 
for the amnesty law.  The E.U. was a strong proponent of the law,201 as it would 
open the way to Serbia and Kosovo’s E.U. accession talks.202 
In Angola, the amnesty law received broad international support.  The UN 
Secretary General's special representative for African Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, 
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travelled to Angola to witness the signing of the ceasefire agreement.203  That 
same year, the UN Security Council replaced the UN Observer Mission in Angola 
with UN Mission in Angola, a larger—non-military—political presence.204 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The purpose of amnesties is to bring an end to conflicts and foster 
reconciliation so society can move forward, as well as facilitating the 
reintegration of the groups that opposed the government during the conflict.  This 
understanding of amnesty goes back to the earliest examples of the Greeks and 
the Romans.205  The vast majority of amnesty laws include peace and 
reconciliation as their stated purpose.  The UN’s support for amnesty is also 
based on its capacity to foster peace, reconciliation, and reintegration.  These are 
essential to rebuilding the fabric of society torn by wars.  It is important that the 
amnesty in Colombia be presented and understood by the Colombian people in 
this context.  It is worth recalling the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
chairperson of the South African TRC: 
 
Amnesty is not meant for nice people.  It is intended for 
perpetrators. . . . Amnesty is a heavy price to pay.  It is, however, the 
price the negotiators believed our country would have to pay to avoid 
an “alternative too ghastly to contemplate.”206 
 
The international legal regime on amnesty has evolved and the endorsement 
of amnesties for political crimes that do not amount to war crimes under Article 
6.5 of Protocol II is the strongest demonstration of the acceptance of such 
amnesties under international law.  As we have seen, neither the Rome Statute nor 
the Inter-American jurisprudence pose an obstacle to an amnesty for political 
crimes and crimes connected to political crimes.  The international community 
has endorsed such amnesties in the past, and a comparative analysis of amnesties 
throughout the world further reinforces the permissibility of such amnesties under 
international law. 
Colombia is one of the first countries to adopt an amnesty for political crimes 
with a clear reference to Protocol II.  Colombia is also the first country to 
contemplate amnesty and a transitional justice process under the jurisprudence of 
both the ICC and the Inter-American Human Rights System.  The Colombian 
experience is therefore precedent setting, and all care must be taken to get it right.  
There is no indication that the amnesty, as it has been articulated so far, violates 
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international law.  On the contrary, as we have seen, it is very much in line with 
the recent evolution of international law on amnesty.  An amnesty such as the one 
proposed in Colombia, adopted under Additional Protocol II to pursue the interest 
of peace and reconciliation, and which covers the mere participation in hostilities 
and political crimes related to that participation that do not rise to the level of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, is compatible with international 
law.  Where the amnesty is coupled with other truth and justice mechanisms, such 
as a truth commission, as is the case in Colombia, its legitimacy is only 
reinforced. 
 
